Of the space and time, Kant concerns them with their metaphysical exposition and their relation to subjective conditions of sensation.
According to Kant , a pure concept of space warrants and constrains intuitions of finite regions of space; that is, an a priori conceptual representation of space provides a governing principle for all spatial constructions, which is necessary for mathematical demonstration as Kant understood (Shabel, L.).
Kant notes that the aesthetic means to constitute and begin with an investigation of space.
The concept of space would be indistinguishable from the general concept of spaces in general.
According to Kant, such a general concept itself rests on limitations of space and cannot itself be the source of the boundlessness of space.
Thus, an exposition of such a general concept of spaces could not be expected to satisfy Kant's goals in the Transcendental Aesthetic (Shabel, L.).
Kant identifies that a concept of space is strictly identical neither to a general concept of spaces, nor to any particular intuition.
Kant admits that space could not be an empirical concept.
According to Kant , concepts are not singular, nor can they contain infinitely many parts; thus, space is represented in intuition and it seems equally impossible to intuit a single infinitely large object.
Therefore, according to Kant's, this would require that we be able to form an immediate (unmediated) representation of an infinite spatial magnitude, that we grasp its infinitude in a single `glance', as it were (Shabel, L.).
So, Kant uses the Metaphysical Exposition, at least in part, to describe the pure spatial intuition that underlies any and all geometric procedures, but he does not use properly geometric procedures to describe that intuition.
While cognition of the `axioms' of geometry depends, in some sense, on our having a capacity for pure spatial intuition, that capacity cannot itself be described as a capacity for geometric reasoning.
So, our capacity for pure spatial intuition , described in the Metaphysical Exposition, is pre-geometric in the sense that it is independent of and presupposed by Euclidean reasoning.
Kant in Ross, K.L. (2001) proposes that space and time do not really exist outside of us but are forms of intuition i.e. conditions of perception imposed by our own minds.
This enables Kant to reconcile Newton and Leibniz.
Kant agrees with Newton that space is absolute and real for objects in experience, i.e. for phenomenal objects open to science.
However, Kant also agrees with Leibniz that space is really nothing in terms of objects as they exist apart from us, i.e. with things in themselves.
The bulk of Kant's exposition on time and space in relation to sensory perception can be found in the opening pages of The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) (Gottfried, P., 1987).
In the first part of the Critique, the "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant treats of time and space as the a priori condition for cognition.
Kant examines time and space as universal forms of intuition that help render sensory impressions intelligible to the human mind.
Kant delivers his explanation to clarify distinction between appearance and illusion, a confused representation of reality.
According to Kant, in space and time, intuition represents both external objects and the self-intuition of the mind. It affects our senses.
Appearance objects are always seen as truly given providing that their situation depends upon the subject's mode of intuition and that the object as appearance is distinguished from an object in itself.
According to Kant, we need not to say that body simply seems to be outside of us when we assert that the quality of space and time lies in our mode of intuition and not in objects in themselves.
Kant, I., 1787, “The Critique of Pure Reason: Preface To The Second Edition”, Translated By J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Retrieved 2003
3 Shabel, l., 2003, “Reflections on Kant's concept (and intuition) of space”, Studies In History and Phi losophy of Science Part A Volume 34, Issue 1 Retreived 2003,
4 Gottfried, P., 1987, “Form of Intuition: Kantian Time And Space Reconsidered”, The World & I: Issue Date: AUGUST 1987 Volume:02 Page: 689. Retrieved 2004
9 Gottfried, P., 1987, “Form of Intuition: Kantian Time And Space Reconsidered”, The World & I: Issue Date: AUGUST 1987 Volume:02 Page: 689. Retrieved 2004