KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC
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By Marsigit, Yogyakarta State University, Indonesia
Email: marsigitina@yahoo.com

Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding

In the Critic of Pure Reason, Kant, 1787, claimed that pure understanding is the source of: all principles, rules in respect of that which happens, and principles according to which everything that can be presented to us as an object must conform to rules. Accordingly, Mathematics is made up of pure a priori principles that we may not ascribe to the pure understanding which is the faculty of concepts. Kant claimed that not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called transcendental ; only that by which we know that certain representations can be employed or are possible a priori; and space is the knowledge that the representations are not empirical is. Kant noted that the distinction between transcendental and empirical belongs only to the critique of knowledge, not to the relation of that knowledge to its objects. Kant perceived truth as agreement of knowledge with its object; the general criterion is it must be valid in each and every instance regardless of how objects vary since truth concerns this very content, a sufficient and general criterion cannot be given. Wallis, S.F, 2004, explored the progressive stages of Kant's analysis of the faculties of the mind which reveals the transcendental structuring of experience; first, in the analysis of sensibility, Kant argues for the necessarily spatiotemporal character of sensation; and then Kant analyzes the understanding, the faculty that applies concepts to sensory experience. According to him, Kant concludes that the “categories” provide a necessary, foundational template for our concepts to map onto our experience. In addition to providing these transcendental concepts, the understanding also is the source of ordinary empirical concepts that make judgments about objects possible. The understanding provides concepts as the rules for identifying the properties in our representations.


According to Kant, 1787, all combination or is an act of the understanding and it called synthesis because we cannot apply a concept until we have formed it; and therefore, 'I think' must accompany all my representations. Intuition in which representation which can be given prior to all thought, has a necessary relation to 'I think’ and is an act of spontaneity that cannot belong to sensibility. The identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis.  The analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity and synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition, as generated a priori, is the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thought. Kant claimed that through the 'I,' as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; for a manifold is given in intuition which is distinct from the 'I.' and only through combination in one consciousness can it be thought.Kant, 1787, insisted that the supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to the formal conditions of time and space; the supreme principle of the same possibility in its relation to the understanding is that the manifold of intuition should be subject to the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Ross, K.L., 2001, exposed that Kant proposes that space and time do not really exist outside of us but are "forms of intuition," i.e. conditions of perception, imposed by our own minds.

While Gottfried, P., 1987, noted from Kant that although the forms of time and space are "subjective conditions of sensation" and depend for their appearance on perceptual activity, they are nonetheless characterized as being a priori: antecedent to the specific sensations for which they provide a conceptual frame.  Kant stated that time existed is not for itself or as an objective quality in things; to conceive of time as something objective would require its presence in things which were not objects of perception; however, since time and space were only knowable as the a priori forms of intuition, any other assumption about them, apart from this context, could not be substantiated. According to Kant, time was also the form of our inner sense, of our intuition of ourselves and of our own inner situation; belonging neither to any pattern nor place, it determined the relationship of perceptions within our inner situation; because this inner intuition as such assumed no shaper, it had to be imagined by positing succession through a line extending ad infinitum in which sensory impressions form a uni-dimensional sequence and by generalizing from the attributes of this line to those of time itself.

The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

Kant, 1787, then strived to demonstrate that space and time are neither experience nor concepts, but they are pure intuition. He called it as Metaphysical Demonstrations of space and time; and concluded that: firstly, space is not an empirical concept obtained by abstraction due to any empirical concept obtained from the external senses such as even "next to each other" presupposes the notion of space; and this means that two things are located at two different spaces. Time is not obtained by abstraction or association from our empirical experience, but is prior to the notion of simultaneous or successive. Space and time are anticipations of perception and are not the products of our abstraction. Secondly, the idea of space is necessary due to the fact that we are not able to think of space without everything in it, however we are not able to disregard space itself. We can think of time without any phenomenon, but it is not possible to think of any phenomenon without time; space and time are a priori as the conditions for the possibility of phenomena. Thirdly, the idea of space is not a universal concept; it is an individual idea or an intuition. There is only one time and various special times are parts of the whole time and the whole is prior to its parts. Fourthly, space is infinite and contains in itself infinitely many partial spaces.

Next, Kant, 1787, developed Transcendental Demonstrations to indicate that the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge are proven only on the basis of Space and Time, as follows: first, If space is a mere concept and not an intuition, a proposition which expands our knowledge about the characters of space beyond the concept cannot be analyzed from that concept. Therefore, the possibility of synthesis and expansion of Geometric knowledge is thus based on space's being intuited or on the fact that such a proposition may be known true only in tuition. And thus the truth of a Geometric proposition can be demonstrated only in intuition. Second, the apodeicticity of Geometric knowledge is explained from the apriority of intuition of space and the apodeicticity of Arithmetics knowledge is explained from the apriority of intuition of time. If space and time be empirical, they do not have necessity; however, both Geometric and Arithmetic propositions are universally valid and necessary true. Third, mathematical knowledge has the objective reality that is, based on space and time by means of which our experiences are possible. Forth, in regard to time, change and motion are only possible on the basis of time.

The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding Kant, 1787, claimed that as a one-dimensional object, time is essentially successive that is one moment follows another; and in order to think time as a succession,  we must generate the time-series that is we must think one moment as following another. Kant suggested that at each point of the series up to that point; therefore, we always think time as a magnitude. Accordingly, since the categories of quantity are those of unity, plurality and totality, we can say that they apply to appearances in that all appearances must be thought as existing within a specific time- span which can be thought as momentary that is as a series of time spans or as the completion of a series of time spans. On the other hand, Kant insisted that we can think of a given time as either empty or full; in order to represent objects in time we must resort to sensation, so that in thinking a time we must always ask whether that time is filled up. Thus the schema of quality is the filling of time; it would be natural to assume that the question whether-a time is full admits of a simple answer of yes or no. However, Kant claimed that reality and negation must be conceived as two extremes or limits, between which exist infinitely many degrees; he called these degrees as "intensive magnitudes"

Meanwhile, Kant, 1787, insisted that time is supposed to relate objects, not to one another, but to the understanding that is, we can think an object in one of three ways: as occupying some time or other, without specifying what part of time that is the schema of possibility in which we can think an object as possible in so far as we can think it as occupying some time or other, whether or not it actually occupies it; as existing in some definite time that is the schema of actuality in which we think an object as actual when we claim that it exists in some specific part of time; and as existing at all times that is the schema of necessity in which an object is thought as being necessary if it is something which we must represent as occupying all times, in other words, that we could not think of a time which does not contain that object. 

Kant summed up that time was to be seen as the formal a priori condition for all appearance; whereas space remained the pure form of al outward intuition, time supplied the subject with an inward orientation essential for perceptual relations (Gottfried, P., 1987). Kant argued that the structure for the a posteriori representations we receive from sensation must itself be a priori; this leads him to the science of a priori sensibility, which suggests that our capacity to receive representations of objects includes a capacity to receive representations of the a priori form of objects. Accordingly, since space is one of two such a priori forms, a priori sensibility includes a capacity to receive pure representations of space (Shabel, L., 2003). Kant denied that time and space as an absolute reality, and maintained that outside of its cognitive function time is nothing; the objective validity of time and space was limited to the regularity of their relationship to sensation, yet within this limited framework their activity was constant and predictable. (Gottfried, P., (1987). Kant supposed to relate objects, not to one another, but to the understanding; that is, we can think an object in one of three ways:  as occupying some time or other, without specifying what part of time; or, as existing in some definite time; or as existing at all times. Kant claimed that at the first is the schema of possibility in which we can think an object as possible in so far as we can think it as occupying some time or other, whether or not it actually occupies it; at the second is the schema of actuality in which we think an object as actual when we claim that it exists in some specific part of time; and in the third is the schema of necessity in which an object is thought as being necessary if it is something which we must represent as occupying all times, in other words, that we could not think of a time which does not contain that object (Kant in Mattey’s G.J., 2004).

It was elaborated in “Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Kant's Criticism against the Continental Rationalism and the British Empiricism”, http://www.Google Search that space and time do not exist by themselves that is they are not real things existing outside of our mind. Kant perceived that Space and Time are not qualities, nor relations belonging to the things in themselves; they are the forms of our empirical intuition and are rooted in the subjective structure of our mind. Further, he claimed that we sense space and time with two forms of empirical intuition and they-themselves intuition at the same time. These intuitions are pure, since they are capable of becoming objects of our inquiry quite apart and independent from our empirical intuition. Kant also claimed that space and time are also a priori, because these intuitions as the forms of empirical intuitions precedes from all empirical intuitions, as long as they are the subjective conditions in which something can be an object of our empirical intuition. Space and time, therefore, are not containers in which all the real things are encompassed, nor the dimension or order which belongs to the things in themselves; they are the forms of our intuition. Kant claimed that our ideas are in regards to their origin either pure or empirical; they are intuitions or concepts.

While Evans, J.D.G, (1999), noted that Kant stated that the notion of object structurally presupposes the subject, so the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception is what is the  end product of a process of connection and synthesis of phenomena, which in turns depend on the application of the representation of an object in intuition to experience. Our minds are not comfortable with simply observing the sensuous world and its connections through universal laws; it requires some knowledge of things in themselves to be content. We know that pure science exists because there are universal laws, such as “substance is permanent” and “every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws” (Kolak, 652 in Meibos, A., 1998). These laws must not be a posteriori, because experience can only teach us what exists and how it exists, but not that it must exist. Neither are they a priori, for we must make our deductions from observations. However, the conformity of experience to constant laws must be an a priori understanding. Through our awareness we have perceptions; then our sensibility, using the concepts of pure understanding, structures these perceptions into experiences which we use to form science; this process is called the schematism of pure understanding, where schemata are notions of objects categorized and structured in time; and the categories can only subsume schemata, and not awareness. (Meibos, A., 1998).

Kant, 1787, claimed that there is only one way in which a mediating element can be discovered, that is, by examining the single element which is present in all appearances, but at the same time is capable of being conceptualized that is “time”. According to him, we must therefore discover various ways of thinking of time, and if we can discover the ways in which this must be done, we can say that they both conform to the conditions of thought and are present in all appearances. Kant calls these conceptualizations of time "schemata"; he then found four fundamental modes of thinking time, one corresponding to each of the basic divisions of categories that are time-series, time-content, time-order, and the scope of time.  Kant also claimed that schemata for the categories of relation are treated separately because the relational categories treat them in respect to one another and that time considered of it-self is successive but not simultaneous, and space is simultaneous but not successive. Kant, therefore noted to think objects in a time-order: as enduring through a number of times that is that of the permanence of substance, as "abiding while all else changes"; as in one state of affairs which succeeds another that is we think the states of substances as occupying a succession of times, in accordance with a rule; and as co-existing that is the schema of reciprocity or mutual simultaneous interaction. 

Next Kant, 1787, claimed that in all subsumptions  under a concept, the representation must be homogeneous with the concept; however  pure concepts of understanding can never be met with any intuition. Hence, Kant argued that the transcendental schema in which it  mediates  principle between category and appearances, must be pure and yet sensible. According to Kant, the application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time that is the schema of the concepts of understanding and mediates the subsumption of appearances under the category. Accordingly, the schema is always a product of imagination; it makes images possible as the products of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination. Kant concluded that there is a schema for each category in which the magnitude is the  generation of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object. Kant defined that quality is the filling of time and reality is the sensation in general pointing to being in time; while negation is  not-being in time and relation is the connecting of perceptions at all times according to a rule of time determination. Further, substance is permanence of the real in time; cause is  the real which something else always follows; community is  the coexistence, according to a universal rule, of the determinations of one substance with those of another. While modality is the time itself as the correlate of the determination whether and how an object belongs to time; possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general; actuality is the existence in some determinate time and the necessity is the existence of an object at all times.

System of all Principles of Pure Understanding

Propositions, according to Kant, 1787, can also be divided into two other types: empirical and a priori; empirical propositions depend entirely on sense perception, but a priori propositions have a fundamental validity and are not based on such perception. Kant's claimed that it is possible to make synthetic a priori judgments and regarded that the objects of the material world is fundamentally unknowable; therefore, from the point of view of reason, they serve merely as the raw material from which sensations are formed.
Kant claimed that the category has no other application in knowledge than to objects of experience; to think an object and to know an object are different things. Accordingly, knowledge involves two factors: the concept and the intuition; for  the only intuition possible to us is sensible, therefore the thought of an object can become knowledge only in so far as the concept is related to objects of the senses; and this determines the limits of the pure concepts of understanding. Kant insisted that since there lies in us a certain form of a priori sensible intuition, the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine inner sense through the manifold of given representations in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception and in this way the categories obtain objective validity. Further Kant insisted that figurative synthesis is the synthesis of the manifold which is possible and necessary a priori; it opposed to combination through the understanding which is thought in the mere category in respect to intuition in general. And it may be called the Transcendental synthesis of imagination that is the faculty of representing in intuition an object which is not present; and of course it belongs to sensibility.

For the principle that all intuition are extensive, as it was elaborated in the Critic of Pure Reason, Kant, 1787, proved it as that all appearances are extensive magnitudes and consciousness of the synthetic unity of the manifold is the concept of magnitude; a magnitude is extensive when the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole. For the principle that in appearances, the real, that is, an object of sensation, has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree, Kant proved that perception is empirical consciousness and appearances are not pure intuition like time and space. They contain the real of sensation as subjective representation; therefore, from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness a graduated transition is possible and there is also possible a synthesis in the process of generating the magnitude of a sensation as well as that the sensation is not itself an objective representation, and since neither the intuition of space nor time has met with it, its magnitude in not extensive, but intensive. Kant proved that experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions; for experience is an empirical knowledge it is a synthesis of perceptions, not contained in perception but itself containing in one consciousness the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions. And since time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can take place only through their relation in time in general; and since these always carry a necessity with them, experience is only possible through a representation of necessary connection of perceptions. Kant claimed that the three modes of time are duration, succession, and coexistence and the general principles of the three analogies rest on the necessary unity of apperception at every instant of time. These principles are not concerned with appearances, only with existence and relation in respect to existence; existence, therefore, can never be known a priori and can not be constructed like mathematical principles so these principles will be only regulative. These analogies are valid for empirical, not transcendental, employment of understanding. In the principle we make use of the category but in its application to appearances, we use the schema.

Phenomena and Noumena

According to Kant, transcendental illusion is the result of applying the understanding and sensibility beyond their limits; although the objective rules may be the same in each case, the subjective idea of causal connection can lead to different deductions (Meibos, A., 1998). While, Evans, J.D.G, 1999, noted that how Kant can be certain that reason connects us directly to things-in-themselves is an question that he cannot answer; all that the Transcendental Deduction aimed at was showing that particular concepts, like causality or substance, are "necessary conditions for the possibility of experience."  Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world; beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly (Wallis, S.F, 2004); Darwall, 1997, cited Kant “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind “; to have meaningful awareness some datum is required, and Kant allows that we possess two sources of input that can serve as such a datum physical sensation  and the sense of moral duty. 

Kant, 1787, admitted that transcendental synthesis of imagination is an action of the understanding on sensibility and is its first application and is the ground of all other applications of the understanding. Kant found that there was a paradox of how inner sense can represent to consciousness ourselves as we appear to ourselves, not as we are. This paradox was coming from the fact that the understanding is able to determine sensibility inwardly; and thus the understanding performs this act upon the passive subject whose faculty it is. While the understanding does not find in inner sense a combination of the manifold, it produces it; and so the inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves. Kant the claimed that in the synthetic original unity of apperception I am conscious only that I am, in which this is a thought, not an intuition and the consciousness of self is very far from being a knowledge of self, I also need an intuition of the manifold in me. According to Kant, the transcendental deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the pure concepts of the understanding need to be clarified that the possibility of knowing a priori, by means of the categories whatever objects present themselves to our senses in respect of the laws of their combination.

On the other hand, Kant, 1787, claimed that the relations which are a priori recognizable in space and time are valid to all the possible objects of experience. However, they are valid only to the phenomena and not to the things in themselves; therefore, space and time have the Empirical Reality and the Transcendental Ideality at the same time. Kant insisted that any thing as long as it is an external phenomenon necessarily appears in spatial relationship; while any phenomenon necessarily is in temporal relationship. It called that space and time are objective to everything which is given in experience, therefore, space and time are empirically real; however, they do not have the absolute reality, because they do not apply to things in themselves, whether as substances or as attributes. Due to space and time have no reality, but are ideal, this then is called the Transcendental Ideality of Space and Time. Kant insisted that we are never able to recognize things in themselves; any quality which is to belong to the thing in itself can never be known to us through senses. At the same time, anything which is given in time is not the thing in itself; therefore, what we intuitively recognize ourselves by reflection, is how we appear as a phenomenon, and not how we really are. (“Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Kant's Criticism against the Continental Rationalism and the British Empiricism”, http://www.Google)

Kant, 1787, claimed that synthesis of apprehension is the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition; synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must conform to time and space. Time and space are themselves intuitions which contain a manifold of their own; they are not presented a priori and they are not just forms of sensible intuitions. Unity of synthesis of the manifold and consequently, a combination to which everything represented in space and time conform, is given a priori as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension, without or within us, not in, but with these intuitions. Kant then concluded that all synthesis was in subject to the categories in which it prescribes laws a priori to appearances and therefore nature where the laws do not exist in the appearances but only relative to the subject. Kant claimed that pure understanding is not in a position to prescribe through categories any a priori laws other than those which are involved in a nature in general that is in conformity to space and time; empirical laws cannot be derived from categories but are subject to them. In term of  the  outcome of this deduction of the concepts of understanding, according to Kant, we cannot think an object save through the categories and cannot know an object so thought save through intuitions corresponding to these concepts; for all our intuitions are empirical, there can be no a priori knowledge except of objects of possible experience.

Objects of themselves have no existence, and space and time exist only as part of the mind, as “intuitions” by which perceptions are measured and judged( Kant, http:// www.encarta.msn. com/). Kant, then stated that a number of a priori concepts, which he called categories, exist; and this category falls into four groups: those concerning quantity, which are unity, plurality, and totality; those concerning quality, which are reality, negation, and limitation; those concerning relation, which are substance-and-accident, cause-and-effect, and reciprocity; and those concerning modality, which are possibility, existence, and necessity. Wallis, S.F, 2004, noted that Kant's transcendental method has permitted him to reveal the a priori components of sensations, the a priori concepts; there are a priori judgments that must necessarily govern all appearances of objects; these judgments are a function of the table of categories' role in determining all possible judgments. Judgment is the fundamental action of thinking; it is the process of conceptual unification of representations; determinate thought must be judgmental in form. Wallis, noted Kant that concepts are the result of judgments unifying further concepts; but this cannot be an infinitely regressing process; certain concepts are basic to judgment and not themselves the product of prior judgments; these are the categories, the pure concepts. Therefore, the Categories are necessary conditions of judging; that is, necessary conditions of thought. As to Kant, we can determine which concepts are the pure ones by considering the nature of judgment.  Judgments can be viewed as unity functions for representations; different forms of judgment will unify representations in different ways.

For Kant, 1787, understanding is the faculty of knowledge and the first pure knowledge of understanding is the principle of original synthetic unity of apperception; it is an objective condition of knowledge and itself, analytic. Kant further claimed that transcendental unity of apperception is how all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of an object; it is objective and subjective unity of consciousness which is a determination of inner sense through which manifold is empirically given. Kant insisted that judgment is the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception; it indicates the objective unity of a given representation's relation to original apperception, and its necessary unity. He then claimed that the representations belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuition that accords to principles of the objective determination of all representations and only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment which is objectively valid. He added that all the manifold is determined in respect of one to the logical functions of judgment and is thereby brought into one consciousness; the categories are these functions of judgment.

Kant, 1787, said that the faculty of understanding is a faculty for synthesis, unification of representations; the functioning of this faculty can be analyzed at two different levels, corresponding to two different levels at which we may understand representations:  a general logical level, and a transcendental level.  In terms of the former, Kant claimed that synthesis results in analytic unity; in terms of the latter, synthetic unity; and the latter takes into account the difference between pure and empirical concepts.  According to Kant, analytic unity is an  analysis of a judgment at the level of general logic indicates the formal relationship of concepts independently of their content; and synthetic unity refers to objectivity.  At the transcendental level, judgments have transcendental content; that is, they are related to some object; they are given to the understanding as being about something.  This is more than a matter of having a certain logical form; inasmuch as the Categories are at play in a judgment, that judgment is a representation of an object.Wallis, S.F, 2004, noted that Kant's next concern is with the faculty of judgment, as Kant said "If understanding as such is explicated as our power of rules, then the power of judgment is the ability to subsume under rules, i.e., to distinguish whether something does or does not fall under a given rule.". He summed up that the following stage in

Kant's project will be to analyze the formal or transcendental features of experience that enable judgment, if there are any such features besides what the previous stages have identified; the cognitive power of judgment does have a transcendental structure. He also identified that Kant argues that there are a number of principles that must necessarily be true of experience in order for judgment to be possible; Kant's analysis of judgment and the arguments for these principles are contained in his Analytic of Principles. Kemerling, G.,2001, considered that, according to Kant, the sorts of judgments consists of: each of them has some quantity;  some quality; some relation; and some modality. He noted that, according to Kant, any intelligible thought can be expressed in judgments of these sorts; but then it follows that any thinkable experience must be understood in these ways, and we are justified in projecting this entire way of thinking outside ourselves, as the inevitable structure of any possible experience. The intuitions and the categories can be applied to make judgments about experiences and perceptions, but cannot, according to Kant, be applied to abstract ideas such as freedom and existence without leading to inconsistencies in the form of pairs of contradictory propositions, or “antinomies,” in which both members of each pair can be proved true.( Kant, http:// www.encarta.msn. com/).

Analogies of Experience

In this analogy Kant, 1787, claimed that experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. Kant strived to prove this principle by exposing some arguments. First, that experience is an empirical cognition; therefore it is a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consciousness; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cognition of objects of the senses, that is, of experience. Second, that in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their connection appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves, because apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition. Third, however, experience is a cognition of objects by means of perceptions, it follows that the relation of the existence of the existence of the manifold must be represented in experience not as it is put together in time, but as it is objectively in time. Fourth, while time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can only take place by means of their connection in time in general, consequently only by means of a priori connecting conceptions; as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, experience is possible only by means of a representation of the necessary connection of perception. 

Further, Kant, 1787, stated that the three modus of time are permanence, succession, and coexistence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience and render it possible.   He said that the general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness at every time, consequently, as this unity lies a priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relation in time. According to Kant, for the original apperception relates to our internal sense and indeed relates a priori to its form, that is to say, the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time; and this manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time- a necessity imposed by the a priori transcendental unity of apperception. 

Kant, 1787 claimed that all empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time; and the analogies of experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature. According to him, these principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern phenomena, and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof, but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner that the rule of its synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a priori intuition in every empirical example. However, as Kant noted, the existence of phenomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that existence determinately, that is to say, we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others. Kant suggested that an analogy of experience is therefore only a rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects not as a constitutive, but merely as a regulative principle; the same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition
which concerns the form of phenomena, the synthesis of perception which concerns the matter of phenomena, and the synthesis of experience which concerns the relation of these perceptions. 

First Analogy

In the First Analogy of the System of All Principles of Pure Understanding, “ Principle of Permanence of Substance”, Kant, 1787, exposed the principle that in all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. Kant proved this principle by elaborated that all appearances are in time; time is the substratum in which coexistence or succession can be represented. Further, Kant claimed that time itself cannot be perceived; therefore there must be in the objects perceived the substratum which represents time in general. Kant then also claimed that the substratum of all that is real is substance; it is the permanent in relation to which alone all time-relations of appearances can be determined.   In this First Analogy, Kant characterizes substance as "something which can exist as subject and never as mere predicate.". Kant said that "substance would mean simply a something which can be thought only as subject, never as a predicate of something else; it can exist as subject only, and not as a mere determination of other things."  Kant claimed that our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always successive, is consequently always changing. Kant claimed that without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible; time in itself is not an object of perception; consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of experience; and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably. Therefore, Kant claimed that in all phenomena, the permanent is the object in itself, that is, the substance (phenomenon); but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or substances, consequently to its determinations. Kant stated that for if that in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone; hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable to future time. 

Kant, 1787, perceived that change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another mode of existence of the same object; hence all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes; since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical that is only the permanent substance is subject to change; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that is, when certain determinations cease, others begin.  Next, he claimed that substances are the substratum of all determinations of time; the beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time; and in that case phenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is absurd. Ultimately, Kant exposed that for there is only one time in which all different times must be placed, not as coexistent, but as successive; accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible experience. 

Second Analogy

In The Second Analogy: “Principle of Succession In Time In Accordance With The Laws Of Causality”, of The System Of All Principles, of Pure Understanding Of The Analytic Of Principles, Kant, 1787, exposed the principle that “all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect”. He strived to prove the principle with the series of arguments. First, that the preceding principle shows that all appearances of succession in time are alterations, not coming-to-be. Second, that appearances follow one another, and it imply that it connects two perceptions and thus this is a synthetic faculty of imagination. Third, that the objective relation of appearance of succession is not determined through perception; in order that this relation be known as determined, it must be so thought that it is thereby determined as necessary which came first; and, necessity can only come from a pure concept of understanding; and thus in this case it is cause and effect. Fourth, the apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. Fifth, appearances, simply in virtue of being representations, are not in any way distinct from their apprehension. And sixth, we do not know if the parts of the object follow one another. 

Kant, 1787, described that there is a subjective succession e.g. of looking at a house top to bottom or left to right, as an arbitrary succession; while objective succession can be such an order in the manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a rule, that which happens follows that which precedes, as an applies to events. Kant claimed that appearance never goes backwards to some preceding time, but it does stand in relation to some preceding time; there must lie in that which precedes an event, the condition of a rule according to which this event necessarily follows. Therefore, according to Kant, the event, as conditioned, thus affords reliable evidence of some condition; this condition is what determines the event. Kant said that we have to show that we never ascribe succession to the object; when we perceive that something happens this representation contains the consciousness that there is something preceding. Kant claimed that only by reference to what preceded does the appearance acquire its time relation; the rule is that the condition under which an event necessarily follows lies in what precedes the event, called the principle of sufficient reason. Kant, ultimately concluded that it is the ground of possible experience; therefore, the relation of cause to effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments. 

Kant, 1787, said that although phenomena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, it is my duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold n apprehension is always successive; when we know in experience that something happens, we always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule; therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in their sequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding state, can we make our subjective synthesis objective, and it is only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible. Further Kant said that we have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious; however widely extended, however accurate and thoroughgoing this consciousness may be, these representations are still nothing more than representations, that is, internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. 

Kant, 1787, explained that for all experience and for the possibility of experience, understanding is indispensable, and the first step which it takes in this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear, but to render the representation of an object in general, possible; it does this by applying the order of time to phenomena, and their existence. He added that to all empirical cognition belongs the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination, a synthesis which is always successive, that is, in which the representations therein always follow one another; however the order of succession in imagination is not determined, and the series of successive representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively; and however if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension, then the order is determined in the object, or to speak more accurately, there is therein an order of successive synthesis which determines an object, and according to which something necessarily precedes, and when this is posited, something else necessarily follows. Kant concluded that the relation of phenomena, according to which that which happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by something which antecedes, in conformity with a rule- in other words, the relation of cause and effect- is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in regard to the sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience; and the principle of the relation of causality in the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of experience, because it is itself the ground of the possibility of experience. 

Third Analogy

In the System of All Principles Of Pure Understanding, Section 3c) Third Analogy: Principle Of Coexistence, In Accordance With The Law Of Reciprocity Or Community, Kant, 1787, delivered the principle that all substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity. Kant strived to prove this principle with the following arguments: First, that “things” are coexistent when in empirical intuition the perceptions of them can follow upon one another reciprocally. Second, that we cannot assume that because things are set in the same time that their perceptions can follow reciprocally; in which, influence is the relation of substances in which one contains the ground of the determinations of another; and the Community or Reciprocity is the relation of substances where each contains the ground of the determinations in the other. Third, that we know two substances are in the same time when the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is a matter of indifference. Fourth, that if each is completely isolated, coexistence would not be a possible perception; therefore, there must be something through which A determines for B and vice versa, its position in time; and only that which is the cause of another determines the position of the other in time. Therefore, it is necessary that the substances stand immediately or mediately in dynamical community if their coexistence is to be known in any possible experience. 
  
Kant, 1787, thought that things are coexistent, when in empirical intuition the perception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice versa- which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena; coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time, however time itself is not an object of perception; and therefore we cannot conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the other fact, that the perception of these things can follow each other reciprocally. He noted that a conception
of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of phenomena, is requisite to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of perceptions has its foundation in the object, and to enable us to represent coexistence as objective; and the relation of substances in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is in the other substance, is the relation of influence; and, when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation of community or reciprocity. 

Kant, 1787,  further claimed that, consequently, the coexistence of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than under the precondition of their reciprocal action; this is therefore the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience; things are coexistent, in so far as they exist in one and the same time; but how can we know that they exist in one and the same time? Next, Kant stated that every substance must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself; substances must stand in dynamical community with each other, if coexistence is to be cognized in any possible experience; but, in regard to objects of experience, that is absolutely necessary without which the experience of these objects would itself be impossible. Consequently, he noted that it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in a relation of complete community of reciprocal action to each other.  Kant concluded that the three dynamical relations then, from which all others spring, are those of inherence, consequence, and composition; these, then, are the three analogies of experience. Accordingly, they are nothing more than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena in time, according to the three modi of this determination; to wit, the relation to time itself as a quantity, the relation in time as a series or succession, finally, the relation in time as the complex of all existence. He claimed that this unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical; that is to say, time is not considered as that in which experience determines immediately to every existence its position; for this is impossible, inasmuch
as absolute time is not an object of perception, by means of which phenomena can be connected with each other.   

Note:

1.    ibid
2.    ibid
3.    See Mattey, G.J., 2004, Kant Lexicon, G. J. Mattey's Kant Home Page, http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/kant/Kant.htm
4.    ibid
5.    Ibid
6.    Ibid
7.    It was inferred from Kant, I, 1781,  THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON,   translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
8.    Ibid.
9.    Ibid.
10.    Ibid.
11.    Carl Brock Sides, 1997, “Kant's First Analogy and the Schema of Substance”
12.    Ibid
13.    Ibid
14.    It was inferred from  Kant's Critique of Pure Reason : BOOK II: ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES, http://www.bright.net/~clarke/kant/analogy2.htm
15.    Ibid
16.    It was inferred from Kant, I, 1781,  THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON,   translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
17.    Ibid.
18.    It was inferred from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason : BOOK II: ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES, http://www.bright.net/~clarke/kant/analogy2.htm
19.    It was inferred from Kant, I, 1781,  THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON,   translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
20.    Ibid.