Apr 5, 2013

Elegi Menggapai "Kant's Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding"

By Marsigit

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, claims that pure understanding is the source of all principles, rules in respect of that which happens, and principles according to everything that can be presented to us as an object must conform to rules. Accordingly, Mathematics is made up of pure a priori principles that we may not ascribe to the pure understanding which is the faculty of concepts. Kant1 claims that not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called transcendental ; only that by which we know that certain representations can be employed or are possible a priori; and space is the knowledge that the representations are not empirical. Kant2 notes that the distinction between transcendental and empirical belongs only to the critique of knowledge, not to the relation of that knowledge to its objects.

Kant3 perceives truth as agreement of knowledge with its object and the general criterion must be valid in each instance regardless of how objects vary. Since truth concerns the content, a sufficient and general criterion cannot be given. Wallis4 explores the progressive stages of Kant's analysis of the faculties of the mind which reveals the transcendental structuring of experience. First, in the analysis of sensibility, Kant argues for the necessarily spatiotemporal character of sensation; and then Kant analyzes the understanding, the faculty that applies concepts to sensory experience. Kant5 concludes that the ?categories? provide a necessary, foundational template for our concepts to map onto our experience. In addition to providing these transcendental concepts, the understanding is also the source of ordinary empirical concepts that make judgments about objects possible. The understanding provides concepts as the rules for identifying the properties in our representations.
According to Kant6, all combination of an act of the understanding is called synthesis because we cannot apply a concept until we have formed it; and therefore, 'I think' must accompany all my representations. Intuition7 in which representation can be given prior to all thought, has a necessary relation to 'I think? and is an act of spontaneity that cannot belong to sensibility. The identity8 of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. The analytic unity of apperception9 is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition. Kant10 claims that through the 'I' as simple representation, no manifold is given; for a manifold is given in intuition which is distinct from the 'I' and only through combination in one consciousness it can be thought.
Kant11 insists that the supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to the formal conditions of time and space; while, the supreme principle of the same possibility in its relation to the understanding is that the manifold of intuition should be subject to the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Ross, K.L. (2001) exposes that Kant proposes that space and time do not really exist outside of us but are "forms of intuition," i.e. conditions of perception, imposed by our own minds. While Gottfried, P (1987) notes from Kant that although the forms of time and space are subjective conditions of sensation and depend on their appearance of perceptual activity, they are nonetheless characterized as being a priori. They are antecedent to the specific sensations for which they provide a conceptual frame.
Kant12 states that time existed is not for itself or as an objective quality in things; to conceive of time as something objective would require its presence in things which were not objects of perception. However, since time and space are only knowable as the a priori forms of intuition, any other assumption about them, apart from this context, could not be substantiated. According to Kant13, time is also the form of our inner sense, of our intuition of ourselves and of our own inner situation; belonging neither to any pattern nor place, it determines the relationship of perceptions within our inner situation; because this inner intuition as such assumed no shaper, it had to be imagined by positing succession through a line extending ad-infinitum in which sensory impressions form a uni-dimensional sequence and by generalizing from the attributes of this line to those of time itself.

1 Kant, I., 1787, ?The Critique of Pure Reason: Preface To The Second Edition?, Translated By J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Retrieved 2003
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Wallis, S.F, 2004, ?Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)?, New York: Media & Communication, The European Graduate School. Retreived 2004
5 Ibid.
6 Kant, I., 1787, ?The Critique of Pure Reason: Preface To The Second Edition?, Translated By J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Retrieved 2003
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Kant, I., 1787, ?The Critique of Pure Reason: Preface To The Second Edition?, Translated By J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Retrieved 2003
13 Ibid.

No comments:

Post a Comment