Elegi Menggapai "Kant's Analogies of Experience"

By Marsigit

Kant elaborates that, in analogy, experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.



Kant strives to prove this principle by exposing some arguments.

First , experience is an empirical cognition; therefore it is a synthesis of perceptions i.e. a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consciousness.

This unity constitutes the essential of our cognition of objects of the senses, that is, of experience. Second , due to apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition, in experience our perceptions come together contingently so that no character of necessity in their connection appears or can appear from the perceptions themselves,

Third , however, experience is cognition of objects by means of perceptions; it means that the relation of the existence of the manifold must be represented in experience not as it is put together in time, but as it is put objectively in time.

Fourth , while time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can only take place by means of their connection in time in general, consequently only by means of a priori connecting conceptions.

As these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, experience is possible only by means of a representation of the necessary connection of perception.

Three modus of time are permanence, succession, and coexistence; accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience and render it possible.

The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness at every time; consequently, as this unity lies a priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relation in time.

According to Kant , for the original apperception relates to our internal sense and indeed relates a priori to its form; it means that the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time.

This manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time i.e. a necessity imposed by the a priori transcendental unity of apperception.

All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time; and the analogies of experience of which we are now about to treat must be rules of this nature.

These principles have this peculiarity, that is, they do not concern phenomena and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof, but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence.

Now the mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner that the rule of its synthesis can give or produce this a priori intuition in every empirical example.

However, as Kant specifies, the existence of phenomena cannot be known a priori although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence.

We could not cognize the existence determinately; it means that we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others.

An analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects not as a constitutive, but merely as a regulative principle.

The same holds good of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which relates to the synthesis of mere intuition which concerns the form of phenomena, relates to the synthesis of perception which concerns the matter of phenomena, and relates to the synthesis of experience which concerns the relation of these perceptions.

a. First Analogy

In the “Principle of Permanence of Substance”, Kant, 1787, exposes that in all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished.

This principle says that all appearances are in time.

Time is the substratum in which coexistence or succession can be represented.

Time itself cannot be perceived; therefore, there must be in the objects perceived the substratum which represents time in general.

Kant mentions that the substratum of all real is substance; it is the permanent in relation to which alone all time-relations of appearances can be determined.

In this “First Analogy”, Kant characterizes substance as "something which can exist as subject and never as mere predicate."

Substance would mean simply a something which can be thought only as subject, never as a predicate of something else.

It can exist as subject only, and not as a mere determination of other things. Our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always successive and consequently always changing.

Without the permanent , then, no relation in time is possible.

Time in itself is not an object of perception; consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time and as the condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of experience.

All existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably.

In all phenomena , the permanent is the object in itself, that is, the substance or phenomenon; but all that changes belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or substances.

If in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existences in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone.

Accordingly, we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phenomenon, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, only because we suppose its existence in all time as it seems rather to be referable to future time.

Change is a mode of existence which follows another mode of existence of the same object; hence all changes is permanent, and only the condition there of changes. Since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say that employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical that is only the permanent substance is subject to change.

The mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that is, when certain determinations cease, others begin.

Substances are the substratum of all determinations of time.

The beginning of some substances and the ceasing of others would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time.

In this case phenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass.

For there is only one time in which all different times must be placed not as coexistent but as successive; accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible experience.

b. Second Analogy

In the “Second Analogy”, Kant exposes that all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.

Kant proves that the preceding principle implies that all appearances of succession in time are alterations i.e. not coming-to-be; those appearances follow one another and connects two perceptions and thus this is a synthetic faculty of imagination.

Kant finds that the objective of relation of appearance of succession is not determined through perception.

In order that this relation is known as determined, it must be so thought that it is thereby determined as necessary which comes first; and, necessity can only come from a pure concept of understanding; and thus, in this case, it is cause and effect.

Further, Kant sums up that the apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive.

Appearances, simply in virtue of being representations, are not in any way distinct from their apprehension because we do not know if the parts of the object follow one another.

There is a subjective succession e.g. of looking at a house top to bottom or left to right, as an arbitrary succession; while objective succession can be such an order in the manifold of appearance according to a rule that happens as an applies to events.

Appearance never goes backwards to some preceding time, but it does stand in relation to some preceding time; there must lie in that which precedes an event i.e. the condition of a rule according to which this event necessarily follows.

Therefore, according to Kant, the event, as conditioned, thus affords reliable evidence of some condition; this condition is what determines the event.

Kant says that we have to show that we never ascribe succession to the object; when we perceive that something happens this representation contains the consciousness that there is something preceding.

Only by reference to what preceded does the appearance acquire its time relation.

The rule is that the condition under which an event necessarily follows lies in what precedes the event, called the principle of sufficient reason.

It is the ground of possible experience in which the relation of cause to effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments.

Kant notes that although phenomena are not things in themselves and nevertheless the only thing given to us to cognize, it is his duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold is always successive.

Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always presuppose that, in conformity with a rule, something precedes.

He emphasizes that, in reference to a rule to which phenomena are determined in their sequences, we can make our subjective synthesis objective, and it is only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible.

Kant says that we have representations within us in which we should be conscious. Widely extended, accurate, and thorough going this consciousness may be, these representations are still nothing more than representations, that is, internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time.

For all experiences and the possibility of experience , understanding is indispensable. The first step which it takes in this sphere is not to render clearly the representation of objects, but to render the representation of an object in general be possible; it does this by applying the order of time to phenomena, and their existence.

All empirical cognition belongs to the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination i.e. a synthesis which is always successive in which the representation always follow one another.

The order of succession in imagination is not determined, and the series of successive representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively.

If this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension, then the order is determined in the object.

There is an order of successive synthesis which determines an object in which something necessarily precedes, and when this is posited, something else necessarily follows.

The relation of phenomena is necessarily determined in time by something antecedes, in other words, in conformity with a rule.

The relation of cause and effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in regard to the sequence of perceptions of their empirical truth i.e. their experiences.

The principle of the relation of causality in the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of experience because it is itself the ground of the possibility of experience.

c. Third Analogy

In the “Third Analogy”, Kant delivers the principle that all substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thorough going reciprocity.

Kant strives to prove this principle with the following arguments:

First , things are coexistent when in empirical intuition, the perceptions of them can follow upon one another reciprocally.

Second , we cannot assume that because things are set in the same time, their perceptions can follow reciprocally in which influence is the relation of substances contains the ground of the determinations of another.

The community or reciprocity is the relation of substances where each contains the ground of the determinations in the other.

Third , we know two substances in the same time when the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is a matter of indifference.

Fourth , if each is completely isolated, coexistence would not be a possible perception; therefore, there must be something through which A determines for B and vice versa in which its position is in time and the cause of another determines the position of the other in time.

It is necessary that the substances stand immediately in dynamical community if their coexistence is to be known in any possible experience.

Things are coexistent when in empirical intuition the perception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other or which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena.

Coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time, however time it-self is not an object of perception.

Therefore we cannot conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time; while the perception of these things can follow each other reciprocally.

A conception of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of phenomena is requisite to justify that the reciprocal succession of perceptions has its foundation in the object and to enable us to represent coexistence as objective.

The relation of substances, in which the one contains determinations the ground of the other substance, is the relation of influence.

When this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation of community or reciprocity.

Consequently, the coexistence of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience except that under the precondition of their reciprocal action.

This is therefore the condition of the possibility of things themselves is an objects of experience.

Things are coexistent in so far as they exist in one and the same time; but how can we know that they exist in one and the same time?

Every substance must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself.

If coexistence is to be cognized in any possible experience, substances must stand in dynamical community with each other; however, it would itself be impossible if it is cognized without experiences of objects.

Consequently, it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in a relation of complete community of reciprocal action to each other.

Kant finds three dynamical relations from which all others spring: inherence, consequence, and composition; these, then, are called three analogies of experience.

According to Kant , they are nothing more than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena in time.

Three modi of determinations covers the relation to time itself as a quantity, the relation in time as a series or succession, and the relation in time as the complex of all existence.

Kant claims that this unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical.

It says that time is not considered as experience determines immediately to every existence of its

References:
Kant, I., 1787, “The Critique of Pure Reason: Preface To The Second Edition”, Translated By J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Retrieved 2003
2Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.